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Abstract: This article uses the case of Thailand’s two economic policies –the border Special Economic Zones 
and the Thailand 4.0 model, to explore geopolitics of the Thai-Burmese borderland. It also discuss a 
theoretical gap in accounting the ways in which the state engages with transnational flows of capital and 
peoples, and proposes to use the concept of ‘border partial citizenship’ to bridge this gap. It argues that the 
shift in Thailand’s economic policy portrayed the different ways in which the Thai state envisaged its 
geographical territory in relations to capital and human mobility. In the border SEZ project, the Thai 
borderland is a site where the state loosened its relationship with its non-subjects. However, while the 
border regions seem increasingly opening for migrant mobility, the inner core of the Thai geo-body, a 
geographical territory that embodies nationhood, is proportionately hyper-sanitized by patriotic discourses 
of the national advancement in knowledge-based economy and the harsh policy toward undocumented 
migrant population.   
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1. Introduction 
After assuming power in May 2014, the military government led by General Prayut Chan-o-cha 
pushed forward the plan to establish special economic zones (SEZs) along the country’s borders. 
During this time, the idea about SEZs was situated in the context of the ASEAN Economic Community 
(AEC), a regional economic integration that promotes connectivity between the member countries 
of ASEAN. The incumbent government under General Chan-o-cha declared the first phase of border 
SEZ pilot projects in six provinces neighboring Myanmar1, Lao PDR, Cambodia, and Malaysia. A scalar 
move with the nearly unchecked power of the military government created an ephemeral euphoria 
among the Thai public given the speculation of economic benefits from the plan. The policy 
implementation, however, later encountered resistance from local entities and the plan to 
materialize SEZs has become sluggish. In December 2016, Thailand 4.0, a new economic model was 
introduced to the Thai public attention. The government made a bolder claim to transform Thailand 
into an unprecedented high-valued and technology-based economy. The narrative about cross-
border connectivity was replaced with an inward-looking development theme infused with new 
buzz words such as innovation, technology research, and sustainable development, etc.  
                                                      
1 A word choice for this country’s official name has been politicized. Some scholars and civil society groups 
prefer ‘Burma’ over ‘Myanmar’ as the latter is a brainchild of the Burmese junta government in 1989. On the 
other hand, the oppose argue, the term ‘Burma’ is a colonialist name given to the country by the British 
colonizers in the late nineteenth century. However, in Burmese language, both terms do exist, yet in 
different registers. While ‘bama’ is more common in colloquial language, ‘myanma’ usually appears in 
literary style. Following this linguistic tradition, in this article I therefore use the term ‘Myanmar’ to refer to 
the country while using ‘Burmese’ to describe peoples from Myanmar that are not limited to the Burman 
ethnic majority, but also includes other ethnicities such as the Karen, the Mon, and the Arakanese.   
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Beyond the surface of this seemingly mundane political uncertainty under the military regime, 
this paper explores a geopolitical aspect of this economic policy shift within a center-periphery 
framework. Focusing on the Thai government’s positioning of borderlands in its changing economic 
vision, I ask: how does the rise and fall of the border SEZs in the Thai national economic agenda 
articulate geopolitics of borderlands? What does this policy change tell us about ways in which the 
state copes with tension between benefiting from global flows of capital and securitizing its territory 
from unauthorized human mobility? Ultimately, how is the Thai geo-body, concisely posited here as 
a spatial conception of nationhood (Winichakul, 1994), envisaged through the state’s development 
plan? I argue that in the border SEZs project, the Thai borderlands are projected as part of a larger 
regional connectivity and a site where a form of the Thai state’s reterritorialization takes place. In 
this process, the Thai state reorganized its relationship to flow of migrant workers within its national 
territory, through the enforcement of Article 14 of the Alien Employment Act B.E.2551 (2008). In 
doing so, the Thai state turns the border SEZs into an ‘economic dam’ 2  where its desire for 
transnational flow of capital is reconciled with its ambivalence toward flow of migrant workers from 
neighboring countries. However, while the border regions seem increasingly opening for migrant 
mobility, the inner core of the Thai geo-body is proportionately hyper-sanitized by patriotic 
discourses of the national advancement in knowledge-based economy and the harsh policy toward 
undocumented migrant population. 
In what follows, I first explain the research methodology. Then, I provide a brief background 
summary of SEZs in Southeast Asia. In Section Four, I discuss Thailand’s economic development in 
the regional context, and articulate tension between free flow of capital and human mobility in the 
form of labor immigration. In Section Five, I outline a theoretical gap in studying the Thai border 
SEZs and propose a framework to account for the peculiarity of the case. In Section Six to Eight I 
provide an analysis of geopolitical implications of the two economic plans, to which the Thai-
Burmese borderland is integral. In the analysis, I demonstrate the way in which the Thai state 
articulates its vision of the Thai geo-body through the positioning of borderlands in its different 
economic discourses. This macro analysis of policy change is interlaced with an ethnography of 
Burmese migrant workers who encountered the manifestation of the Thai state’s vision firsthand in 
the Thai-Burmese border areas.  
2. Methodology 
In this article, I employ an interdisciplinary approach to create an analysis of Thailand’s rapidly 
changing socio-economic and political landscapes and the way in which these changes impact 
people on the ground, especially the marginalized group like migrant workers in the border areas. 
Documentary research is the main method for this article. In order to answer the research questions 
mentioned above, I collected and analyzed a variety of relevant resources such as Thai laws on labor 
migration and immigration control, the Thai government’s press releases, and various kinds of 
media and newspapers. The data analysis in this documentary research is substantiated with the 
ethnographic data gained from my fieldwork in migrant communities in the Thai-Burmese border 
area where a border SEZ is located.  
As for the ethnographic part, the main research site is Mae Sot, a Thai most western border 
boomtown across Myawaddy, Myanmar. I had an opportunity to conduct fieldwork in Mae Sot in 
three visits during 2014-2017. These visits lasted six, three, and two months, respectively, with a 
gap year in 2016.3 During my fieldworks, I worked with three field research assistants whose first 
                                                      
2 It is not my intention to claim the originality for the idea of border SEZs as an economic dam as the idea 
has been discussed by many scholars. However, my point here is to demonstrate that the idea of the 
‘economic dam’ is formalized with the enforcement of Article 14 of the Alien Employment Act B.E.2551.    
3 The first two fieldworks in 2014 and 2015 were part of a research project entitled “Mae Sot SEZ: 
Implications of Global/Regional Integration on Workers, State, and Region.” This project was led by Dr. 
Decha Tangseefa (Thammasat University) and funded by the Thailand Research Fund (TRF). I am always 
grateful for the exemplary mentorship and generosity of Dr. Decha Tangseefa, who not only guided me 
through this incredibly complexed field, but also allowed me to use some of the data from this project for 
my independent study including this article. The third fieldwork in 2017 was funded by the Henry Luce 
Foundation Hawai’i-Wisconsin Faculty/student Collaborative Research Fellowship, in which I am also grateful 
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language was Burmese and they were fluent in English and/or Thai.4 Each assistant helped me 
translating the interviews with migrant workers and cross-border civil society personnel who were 
not comfortable speaking in Thai and English. Although the assistants’ familiarity to the migrant 
communities in Mae Sot and its vicinity, often helped facilitate the research activities a great deal, 
the two-fold translation was indeed challenging. Hence, throughout the three phases of field 
research, the assistants and I spent much more time than we had expected cross-checking and 
validating data from the interviews and participant observation in the communities to lessen this 
linguistic gap as much as we could. This effort was to ensure that our claim for an emic view about 
migrant lives in the Thai-Burmese borderlands reflects the social realities our informants 
experienced.    
While the field research allows me to foreground migrants’ firsthand experiences that tend to 
be glossed over in the mainstream narratives about economic policy in national level, the spatial 
dimension of cross-border labor migration and the state’s economic policy is not less crucial. should 
one hope to discern the intersection between these two phenomena. Therefore, in this article, I 
engage theoretically with spatial concepts from the discipline of geography to propose an 
alternative framework that accommodates both space and flow that are constitutive of each other. 
3. SEZs in the Southeast Asian context 
There are many terms used to describe geographically designated zones where firms can 
benefit from more relaxed laws and regulations as incentives for their investment. Those terms 
include, but not limited to, special economic zone, free trade zone, export-processing zone, 
enterprise zone, bonded warehouse, free port, maquiladora, etc. However, these nomenclatures 
share some common key characteristics and goals such as designated geographical areas for 
investment-- trade or manufacturing, or both; tax incentives; relaxed labor laws; pre-constructed 
facilities; attract investment to boost economic in either regional or national level.    
Papadopoulos and Malhotra (2007) categorize the zones into two categories: zones that 
promote import or export activities; and zones that allow only trade or manufacturing. Therefore, 
in this sense, the term ‘export-processing zone’ might be more appropriate in the context of the 
international political economy in which the role of developing countries is emphasized and 
positioned in the global supply chain. In the meantime, special economic zone although sounds 
broader and more generalized highlights the state of exception in which the state executes its 
power. Either way, the development of the practice in the context of the global economy show both 
perspectives are the different sides of the same story: the emergence of powerful transnational or 
multinational companies (TNCs or MNCs) and the shift in their practice of global subcontracting 
(IBON Books, 2005).  
SEZs in Southeast Asia, although locally situated within national boundaries, need to be 
contextualized in a regional economic cooperation entitled the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS). 
Thame (2017) argues that SEZ has played a central role in the Greater Mekong Subregion Economic 
Cooperation Program (GMS-ECP) since the mid-1990s. Being established in 1992, GMS is a brainchild 
of Asian Development Bank (ADB) and is comprised of China and 5 Southeast Asian countries namely 
Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam, all of which are the countries geographically 
linked together through the course of the Mekong River. This regional economic cooperation is 
designed as a mechanism to support the regional development through industrialization and 
regional economic integration. GMS, as an investment-promotion program is therefore connected 
to the global restructuring in subcontracting in the sense that GMS essentially seeks to establish 
favorable conditions for the private sector through multilateral investments in infrastructure, trade, 
and tourism across contiguous subregion (ibid).  
Moreover, the goal of the ADB-led GMS also corresponds with the ASEAN economic plan to 
create a single market and production base in Southeast Asia broadly through the reduction of tariff 
                                                      
for the incredible support and constructive feedbacks from the two mentors: Dr. Jonathan Padwe 
(University of Hawai’i at Mānoa) and Dr. Ian Baird (University of Wisconsin-Madison).   
4 Crystal Maung, Spring Song, and Kzin Thuang Oo are graduates of the Children Development Center (CDC) 
School. 
Forest and Society. Vol. 2(1):65-78, April 2018  68 
 
barriers and the integration of Southeast Asian economy into the larger regional and global markets. 
As a result, a range of trade liberalization agreements has been formalized within the region. On the 
other hand, a significant amount of investment in infrastructure, including roads, railways, ports, 
bridges, power stations, high-voltage transmission lines, and telecommunications, resulted in a 
comprehensive infrastructure network called “Economic Corridors,” connecting high economic 
potential cities across the region (ibid). SEZs have been built along these Economic Corridors to take 
advantage of their strategic location in the regional trade and investment network. Given that these 
Economic Corridors cut across the heartland of the member countries and connect cities with high 
economic potential together internationally as nodes in the network, the SEZs are therefore not 
necessarily located at the country’s geographical borders.  
4. Thailand and Regional Labor Migration 
It is important to note that these regional economic development efforts in GMS are also 
embedded in the long histories of war and conflicts, which in turn had a significant impact on the 
path each Southeast Asian country has taken for its development goal. During the Cold War period, 
GMS countries were inevitably entangled with power struggle between the major powers. While 
Lao PDR and Vietnam were taken over by the communist parties, Myanmar closed its door and 
remained under the authoritarian regime for decades. In the meantime, Cambodia experienced a 
tragic political turmoil that resulted in the loss of million lives under the Khmer Rouge.  Whereas 
its neighbors had encountered major obstacles, Thailand had a more stable political situation that 
led to a success in reaching UN’s development goals in the late 1980s.  
Thailand unleashed its economic potentials by replacing its Import-substitute industry with 
export-oriented policy. The success in industrialization also resulted in economic growth, better 
living conditions and high rate of literacy among its population (Pearson and Kusakabe, 2012). This 
achievement consequently led to the two significant demographic trends afterwards (Paitoonpong 
and Chalaemwong, 2012). First, in the 1980s the emigration of Thai labor to work abroad for better 
payment tightened the domestic labor market. Second, migrant workers from neighboring countries 
where the economic disparity with Thailand was significantly high started to fill in the job vacancies. 
These migrants have become a fundamental driving force for the country’s export-led 
manufacturing and other labor-intensive industries after since. However, while Thailand’s economic 
growth depends a great deal on migrant labor, the Thai state has been caught in the dilemma 
between its national security and economic interest as the majority of migrant workers in Thailand 
is believed to be undocumented. Tang (2005) argues that undocumented migrant workers from 
Myanmar have emerged as a new class in Thai society since the 1990s.  
Legality has become a twin issue of labor migration in Thailand as the most recent estimation 
of undocumented migrant workers in Thailand rose from 2-3 million in 2014 to 4-5 million in 2016 
(IOM, 2017). Various social issues entangled around the politics of (il)legality of undocumented 
migrant workers. While the fear of the unknown led the nationalist to see undocumented migrant 
workers as a national threat and welfare burden, civil society advocates called for a better right 
protection mechanism for the workers who have suffered rights violation and exploitation by both 
business and state authorities. Since the 1990s, there has always been a series of legalization policy 
that tries to cope with the tension between economic demand for cheap labor and the national 
security. This constant stress manifested clearly in the spatial aspect of the legalization of 
undocumented migrant workers.  
As mentioned previously, the presence of undocumented migrant workers in Thai society has 
been so prevailing since the 1990s. The migrant population have lived and worked across the 
country far beyond the border areas. But during this decade, the government policy regarding 
legalization was geographically limited: the workers were allowed to register and work only within 
the designated border province of registration. The geographical limitation continued until 2003 
when the incumbent administration launched the first nationwide registration although the types 
of industries remained limited (Paitoonpong and Chalamwong, 2012, 44). In this sense, one can 
picture the way in which the Thai state gradually allowed the infusion of the migrant Other into its 
geo-body. However, the policy has yet to resolve the problem of illegal immigration as the 
government had expected.  
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5. Space and Flows 
The global economic restructuring in the 1980s led to major changes in the world economic 
and political systems. On the one hand, this economic restructuring led to the emergence of the 
global supply chain (Sassen, 1990). Free flow of capital challenged the conventional ideas about the 
state and its sovereignty. The rising trend of special economic zone implementation across the globe 
is a manifestation of this point (IBON Books, 2005). On the other hand, the global capitalism disposes 
people from their means of production, which led to the labor migration worldwide. These two 
trends are intrinsically connected; they contribute and perpetuate one another.  
However, these two phenomena are often discussed in the two separate contexts. SEZ  is 
discussed in the structural context where free flow of global capital and the state’s control over 
“things” within its territory are in tension with one another. On the other hand, migrant figures 
emerged as a consequence of the dispossession form means of production by the global economic 
restructuring, and they are made vulnerable by the states’ negligence. Scholars often theorize these 
migrants’ experiences in the context of unequal power relations between the sovereign and its non-
subjects, through the Agambenian conception of bare life. Both approaches—the state-capital on 
the one hand, and migrant as bare life on the other, have different focuses, and therefore provide 
different yet relevant narratives. These two sides of the same story raise a question of how the two 
phenomena—SEZ implementation and labor migration in relations to the state, can be theorized as 
contributive to one another in the same scenario.  
5.1 Graduated Sovereignty  
Theorizing the interactions between the state and global economic forces through the 
economic liberalization policy, Ong (2000) proposes the concept of ‘graduated sovereignty’ to 
explore relationships and interactions between global corporations and non-market entities. In her 
classic piece “Graduated Sovereignty in South-East Asia,” Ong, influenced by Michel Foucault’s 
concepts of the modern governmentality and biopolitics, proposes the concept of graduated 
sovereignty as an analytical framework to understand the way in which modern state governs 
beyond the traditional means such as military and legal power. The modern state no longer simply 
employs supreme power over its populations. Rather, the state governs its population in several 
forms, all of which are integral to both state and society as Ong writes: “[s]tate management of the 
population [...]requires different modalities of government, based on mechanism of calculation, 
surveillance, control and regulation that set the terms, and are constitutive of a domain of social 
existence” (56).  
Ong situates her Foucauldian conception in the context of the global economy where 
interactions between states, global markets, and transnational regulatory agencies, create new 
economic possibilities, and socio-political spaces. She argues that graduated sovereignty, or flexible 
modes of governing in my understanding, is a product of the interactions between state and 
globalization, and uses this model to describe two ways in which individual Southeast Asian 
countries have responded to the restructuring in global capitalism. First, the different ways in which 
state treats its population as the global market forces; second, the state-transnational network 
which is demonstrated in the practice of establishing SEZs. 
Since Ong introduced the concept of ‘graduated sovereignty’ to the academia, multiple case 
studies of SEZs, especially in the Southeast Asian context, have shown the key features of state’s 
graduated sovereignty-- differential treatments of citizens and transnational production network 
between states themselves, as well as transnational corporations. SEZs, usually accommodating 
export-oriented manufacturing industry, have been regarded as a spatial exception where the state 
allows exclusive treatments for global capitalism at the expense of their own national citizen. Nyiri 
(2012) discusses in the context of post-national world order. Following Ong, he starts with the 
acknowledgment that SEZ is the zone of exception where the state carved out some of the national 
territories, followed the profit-maximizing logic of neoliberal flexibility, but ultimately remained 
under the control of the nation-state elites (534). In the SEZ in Lao borderlands, Nyiri argues that 
post-national sovereignty is practiced. While both the Laotian, and the Chinese governments as the 
main facilitator of the SEZ investment and development, posses aspects of sovereign control over 
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the territories and people working therein, much of the sovereignty is vested in a private 
corporation. This corporation, in turn, borrows the administrative and symbolic trappings of one 
and sometimes both states to bolster its own legitimacy. 
5.2 Migrant as Bare Life   
The global economic restructuring in recent decades has engendered an unquenchable 
demand for flexible migrant labor. On the contrary, the mobility of those who provide the highly 
demanded cheap labor is less likely to be embraced and more to be obstructed at, or even beyond 
the borders of the labor migration destination countries. Consequently, irregular migration has also 
become a global phenomenon alongside with the structural changes in the global economy. The 
experiences of social exclusion, labor exploitation, and rights violation, all of which have become a 
new normal for migrants, lead to political claims that test the limits of citizenship, the extension of 
political community and the expression of human rights (McNevin, 2007: 183).  
Scholars from various disciplines have employed the concept of bare life by an Italian 
philosopher, Giorgio Aganben, to account for these migrants’ experiences across the globe. Nair 
(2009) explains how the Malaysian state, one of the prominent labor migration destination in 
Southeast Asia, rendered migrant workers in its territory, bare life to serve the state’s internal 
political purposes. The migrant others were the one to be blamed on for high unemployment rates 
among nationals, for fostering violent crimes, and for spreading contagious diseases (109). In the 
meantime, migrants suffered extremely low wages and poor working conditions, and without any 
access to rights protection.  
Rajaram and Grundy-Warr (2004) also draw from Agamben’s related concept of homo sacre 
and link this Roman-borne concept to a broader context of Southeast Asia and Australia. The authors 
use the case of Australia, Malaysia, and Thailand to portray how these states denied rights to 
irregular migrants who were subjected to the formers’ jurisdiction. Although Rajaram and Grundy-
warr’s main focus is the operation of detention centers or legal mechanism of the states that aim at 
coping with irregular migration to their territory, refugee and migrant-- two seemingly distinct 
categories of bare life, are portrayed as the subjects of the sovereign power.  
The mixed basket of bare life in Rajaram and Grundy-warr, although vividly illustrates the 
different ways in which the state sovereignty renders irregular migrant lives vulnerable, I argue that 
the capitalist relationships between the state, market, and migrants themselves, is also made 
obscure. In this regard, I argue that the use of the concepts of graduated sovereignty for theorizing 
SEZs, and bare life for migrant workers, are the two sides of the same coin. They are intrinsically 
connected but often diverted into different courses of analysis. While SEZs as a spatial practice of 
the sovereign articulates the topographic approach, the state’s project of making bare life is 
engaged with the topological approach to the borderland studies. Considering Thailand’s border 
SEZs, I attempt to bring together these two foci--the state’s spatial practice and its governmentality 
over migrant bodies, by discussing the concept of border partial citizenship.      
5.3 Border Partial Citizenship 
Pongsawat (2007) draws on Foucault’s governmentality and politics of surveillance to discuss 
the identification card issuance as the Thai state’s tool to declare one its subject, non-subject, and 
those who are included into the political discussion ‘partially’ as ‘border partial citizens.’ He 
discusses specifically the process of legalization in the 1990s in which the Thai government allowed 
Thai employers to bring in their undocumented migrant workers to register with the local 
authorities. Then, the workers would receive amnesty for their illegal entry to the country, thereby 
being eligible for temporary residency and work permit.  
The partiality of citizenship right is expressed in the way that the issues of citizenship and 
immigrant were bypassed and rearticulated as a pure labor supply of production under the control 
of the state and the employer. During this time, the status granted to migrant workers after they 
came out of the shadow was not completely legalized immigrant. Rather it indicated the temporary 
status which was in waiting for deportation. The workers were required to reside only within the 
designated provinces where they registered, and not allowed to change the employer. This created 
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a large pool of flexible labor power to supply the unquenchable demand for Thailand’s export-led 
industry. Pongsawat argues that “it was the articulation of the political economic development in 
Thailand and the influx of illegal migration from Myanmar that led to the formulation of the new 
border partial citizenship regime” (189). He argues further that this border partial citizenship regime 
was also a building block for cross-border economic development as the regime created flexibility 
for the Thai state to control both its economy and the unauthorized human mobility within its 
territory.  
The Thai state’s policy which Pongsawat conceptualizes as the border partial citizenship later 
on was transformed to a seemingly more relaxing immigration law enforcement. This new legal 
practice although is different in detail from the legalization in the 1990s, still serves the purpose of 
the Thai state in dealing with the structural constraint between flows of capital investment and of 
cheap labor essential to maintaining the former within its territory.   
6. Border SEZs and the Formalization of an Economic Dam    
SEZs in GMS although are developed based on the concept of connectivity, there are two folds 
to be unpacked here. First, it encourages free flow of things and tourists, not all the laborers (Jones, 
2016). Kudo and Ishida (2013) argue that cross-border development depends on a good balance 
between the divisiveness from the existence of the borders and the openness that allows movement 
of resources.  Thailand’s border SEZs plan exemplifies well this paradox as it is designed to take 
advantage of the disparity between Thailand and its neighboring countries.  
SEZ has been part of the economic dream of the Thai state at least since 2004. The then Prime 
Minister Thaksin Shinawatra tried to push the bill about the land use for establishing the special 
economic zone. The practice of SEZ was believed to attract foreign direct investment to boost the 
Thai economy. But the bill did not pass through the parliament and fell short ever since. However, 
ten years after the bill was proposed by the Shinawatra civilian government, the idea was brought 
back to public attention again in 2014 by the military government led by General Prayut Chan-o-cha. 
The military government exercised its nearly unchecked power through Article 44 of the 2014 
interim constitution of Thailand. This controversial section gave the head of the National Council for 
Peace and Oeder (NCPO), the then governing body of the country, a power to release any order 
deem appropriate to suppress threats to national security, societal harmony, and the royal 
monarchy. Among many other things, the NCPO used this legal tool to expedite the plan to 
materialize border SEZs. The National Committee on Special Economic Zone Development (NC-SEZ) 
was founded as a mechanism to push forward the policy implementation. The NC-SEZ is comprised 
of the government agencies responsible directly to the infrastructures the Thai government 
promised to provide. These include necessary infrastructures, investment incentives, cross-border 
management of daily foreign workers, one-stop service centers, and other necessary activities. 
Although the implementation faced some resistance from local communities, the six pilot projects 
were pushed forward in the six border provinces namely Tak, Sa Kaeo, Trat, Mukdahan, Songkhla 
and Nong Khai. 
A grand narrative that helped promote the SEZs project was the economic potential of the SEZ 
in ASEAN connectivity network and the upcoming ASEAN Economic Community (AEC). In a piece of 
the Thailand Board of Investment (BOI) promoting documents, the economic potential of the border 
SEZs lies in the cross-border connectivity between Thailand and its neighboring countries, as well as 
the economic opportunity from intraregional cooperation with AEC (Board of Investment  
(Thailand), 2015: 4). However, the Thai borderlands were not imagined naively as a bridge that 
facilitates transnational movement, at least for cross-border labor migration. Rather, the 
enforcement of Article 14 which will be discussed later, implies the border SEZ as an economic dam 
to funnel supplies, including labor supply, from neighboring countries while preventing the flow of 
migrant labors from flooding the inner part of the country. An official promoting document targeting 
foreign audience  also stated clearly that the SEZs would help solve the problems of illegal 
immigration and smuggling of unauthorized produce from neighboring countries (Integrating with 
ASEAN and Connecting Thailand to the Global Community, Royal Thai Embassy, 2017).  
However, when considering the trends in legalization since the 1990s, the new law signified a 
change in the position of the Thai state signaling an attempt, as Popescu (2012) argues, to remain 
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relevant in the changing socioeconomic landscape of the twenty-first century. The implementation 
of Article 14 shows a form of reterritorialization of the Thai state’s geo-body. Up to the enforcement 
of Article 14, the policy toward undocumented migrant workers in Thailand is mostly in ad hoc and 
“defensive” manner as the government had launched rounds and rounds of registration and 
amnesty for illegal immigrants who already crossed the border and were residing in Thailand. In the 
meantime, the cumbersome and costly government-to-government labor import scheme has 
evidently resulted in a very low number of participants. Not to mention that the migrants who 
migrated to Thailand through this government-to-government channel were still documented facing 
right violation and mistreatment by the government authorities (MoU system still exploits workers, 
Bangkok Post, 2016). Crossing the porous borders is still easier and more affordable.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Porous border enables border crossing without the state's authorization. In the photo, 
borderland people are crossing the Moei River, the international border line between 
Thailand and Myanmar. The Photo was taken by the author from the Thai-Myanmar 
Friendship Bridge where the official border pass is located.  
 
The Thai state might have eventually come to understand this nature of the border, and 
implemented Article 14, which I argue here as a form of reterritorialization. Initially, Article 14 
started only for seasonal migrant worker employment, particularly in agricultural industry where 
the cheap labor is needed most during harvest season. Later on, along the way the idea of SEZ has 
been developed and pushed forward, business stakeholders from the industrial sector advocated 
stretching the limit off (personal Interview, 2015). As of January 2018, the validation period of 
seasonal worker entry was extended to with 90 days/entry to accommodate manufacturing industry 
along the borders (Seasonal Alien Workers, National Broadcasting Services of Thailand, 2017).    
In short, Article 14 loosens up the immigration protocol for immigrant workers from the 
neighboring countries that share contiguous borders with Thailand. The workers could use border 
pass issued in local administrative office, instead of passport or certificate of identity, which usually 
takes a longer time to be issued with higher cost compared to border pass. The immigrants can cross 
the border to Thailand, apply for work permit, and take a medical check-up. However, the registering 
process still requires that the immigrants register with their employers and they will be required to 
stay only within the designated border areas only. On the one hand, this practice signified a change 
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from borderlines, to borderlands, a zone where traditional relationships between the sovereign and 
flow of migrants are reorganized. 
While it seems increasingly relaxing, this happens concurrently with a stronger push to legalize 
undocumented workers already living in Thailand through the intensification of legalization of 
undocumented migrant workers in the inner parts of the country. On the one hand, the Thai  
government tried to funnel undocumented migrant workers who already reside in Thailand to go 
through the national verification process and/or push them to leave the country and re-enter again 
through the government-to-government MOU process.  
7. Thailand 4.0 and the Sanitization of the Thai Geo-Body  
In the late 2016, the Thai government introduced “Thailand 4.0,” a new economic vision to the 
Thai society. Thailand 4.0, as a holistic approach to development, aims at escaping the middle-
income trap caused by the previous development policy which focused on rudimental agricultural 
production (Thailand 1.0), light industry (2.0), and advanced industry (3.0). A goal of the model is to 
reach at 4.0 level or knowledge-based economy, which is driven by high-valued technology. The 
vision not only focuses on the new paradigm of national economic development, but also addresses 
social and environmental challenges in the twenty-first century. As stated on the website of the 
Royal Thai Embassy in Washington, D.C., Thailand 4.0 will also “create a society that moves forward 
without leaving anyone behind...through the realization of the full potential of all members of 
society....[and] become a livable society that possesses an economic system capable of adjusting to 
climate change and low carbon society” (Thailand 4.0, Royal Thai Embassy, 2017a). 
The Thailand 4.0 model aims at shifting from labor-intensive and rudimentary technology 
industries to the value-based and innovation-driven economy through a significant investment in 
technology and research development. Regarding technological transition, the Thai government 
launched the “5+5 Superclusters Scheme”; the first promoted five industries will be build up on the 
traditional economic strength namely Next Generation Automotive, Smart Electronics, Affluent, 
Medical and Wellness Tourism, Agricultural and Biotechnology, Food for the Future. Also, the other 
five groups are newly promoted industries with the main goal to enhance the country’s capabilities 
and to shift from its comparative advantage to competitive advantage. The latter group consists of 
Robotics, Aviation and Logistics, Biofuels & Biochemical, Digital, Medical Hub (Development of 
Technology Cluster and Future Industries, Royal Thai embassy, 2017b). 
While the narrative about economic development model changed from export-oriented 
industry to value-based economy, the emphasis on the border SEZs was also replaced with the 
Eastern Economic Corridor (EEC), a new vision for the high-value industrial zone. Although EEC was 
also positioned as a special economic zone, it is not designed to accommodate export-oriented, 
labor-intensive industry like its other counterparts along the borders. EEC is to be built up on the 
existing facilities of the oil refinery and automobile parts in the Eastern Seaboard industrial zone, 
located on the country’s eastern coast area in 3 provinces namely Chachoengsao, Chonburi, and 
Rayong.  
The positioning of EEC corresponds with the larger narratives about the goals of Thailand 4.0 
and how Thai nationhood was mobilized to unite divisive Thai society. A variety of knowledge-based 
economy buzz words were infused with sufficiency economy philosophy, introduced and 
popularized by the late King Bhumibol Adulyadej,5 who emphasizes on moderation and balance 
(Public Relation Department, 2016). Through these nationalist discourses, every entity of the Thai 
society is begged to play their part and contribute to the sustainable development of the country. It 
                                                      
5 The late King Bhumibhol Adulyadej was the ninth monarch of Thailand from the Chakri dynasty. Upon his 
death in October 2016, the much revered King was the longest-serving monarch who ruled for 70 years . 
During his reign, the King has become the center of the Thai society through his nationwide royal 
development projects that aim at eliminating poverty among his subjects, as well as his interventions in the 
political crises throughout Thailand’s contemporary political history. At a ceremony of the 60th anniversary 
of his ascent to the throne in June 2006, the King received the United Nations’ first Human Development 
Lifetime Achievement Award presented to him by the then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan.    
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is an attempt by which the military government use to legitimate its ruling power as a savior to unite 
the country that has been politically divided for the past decade. 
While the country’s dream-like vision is moving toward the high-valued economy, the plan to 
establish labor-intensive border SEZs becomes a stale bread. Again, in the website of the Royal Thai 
Embassy in Washington D.C., the Border SEZs is mentioned briefly with only a sentence hidden in 
Agenda Five about ASEAN regional connectivity, written: “[SEZs] will improve economic 
opportunities and competitiveness, attract investment both domestic and international while 
simultaneously regulate the border economic areas to resolve issues such as illegal migrant workers 
and the trafficking of agricultural products from neighboring countries” (Integrating with ASEAN and 
Connecting Thailand to the Global Community, Royal Thai Embassy, 2017c).  
The geographical areas of these 4.0 technology clusters are unclear. But in principle, it is 
supposed to be linked together through logistics infrastructure of supply chains, which corresponds 
with the GMS model of regional development. The plan is to upgrade the existing industries to a 
more advanced technology-based one while the labor-intensive manufacturing industry is for the 
border areas. In this sense, the border is othering through the Thai state’s economic cosmology of 
technology evolution. Outside the border zones, the legalization of the undocumented migrant 
workers has been high on agenda. The Thai state hopes to make legible (Scott, 1999) the immigrants 
whose lack of record has engendered the fear of the unknown. While the border seems opening, 
the inner core of the Thai geo-body is hyper-securitized.  
In June 2017, the Thai government passed a new Royal Decree in Migrant Labor Management 
B.E. 2561 (2018) to tackle the problem of irregular labor migration to the Kingdom. The new provides 
the guidelines for migrant worker employment and the types of work that migrant workers are 
allowed to take, as the previously revoked Alien Employment Act (2008) did. However, the different 
is that the new Decree has a novel aim at addressing the problem of both illegal migration and 
human trafficking. It increases the penalty for both employers and workers who violate the laws, 
and provides some specific guideline to protect Victim of Trafficking and to persecute those 
traffickers. The aspect relevant to illegal employment tremendously impacted the Thai business and 
industries across the board. The fear of severe punishment, i.e. exorbitant fine and imprisonment, 
led to an abrupt layoff from the employer side and the exodus of migrant workers who abandoned 
the jobs and returned their home across the borders. To mitigate the situation, the government 
inevitably postponed the enforcement to the end of June 2018 in hopes of granting enough 
transition period for both business communities and the workers for legalization process.  
In essence, the Thai State is sanitizing the inner core of the country while letting its periphery 
to be a buffer zone where both capital and labor can be circulated and exploited without disrupting 
“Thailand Proper.” Although the government acknowledges the issue of human trafficking and 
attempts to revise the law to address such problems, legality and legalization of migrant workers 
remain central to the public discourses and government policy. 
8. The Geo-Body Enclosure and Peoples in the Borderland 
In January 2018, H.E. Police General Adul Sangsingkeo, Thailand’s Minister of Labor urged 
employers and migrant workers not to delay their application to avoid missing the deadline in June 
2018 and become illegal and subject to the new decree (“รมต แรงงานสัง่เร่ง.” [Minister of Labor 
Urges.]. ThaiPBS, 2018). This extended period is meant to provide ‘enough’ time for the government 
agents, as well as roughly one million workers whose applications have already been in the system, 
to finish the ongoing national verification. Civil society advocating for migrant worker rights voiced 
a concern toward the bureaucratic and corruptive legalization that could do more harm than good 
to the workers. The Migrant Rights Promotion Working Group (MRPWG) reported some broker 
company agents, as they claimed, were lying in wait for migrant workers in front of the One-Stop 
Service Center in Mae Sot and tried to funnel the migrant workers to their legalizing services instead 
of entering the Center. Despite the government’s effort to regulate the abusive broker companies, 
the MRPWG’s statistic revealed that in every month throughout the year 2017, there were at least 
five cases in which migrant workers in Mae Sot were hindered from processing their status 
adjustment due to such broker incident (“เครอืขา่ยสง่เสรมิ.” [Network of.]. Prachatai, 2018). This 
report not only shows the negative side-effects of legalization, but also the potential of corruptive 
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system. More importantly, the estimation of one million workers mentioned in the media, is only 
the number of those who had already started their legalizing process whereas the estimated of 
undocumented migrant workers in Thailand has never become clear to either the government 
agencies or civil society. It is very likely that there remains a large group of migrant population who 
have never been involved in any kind of registration. These people, as well as the new comers, are 
not counted in the current narrative. Thus, by July 2018, we can still expect a number of migrant 
workers in the country who are even more at risk of being punished by exorbitant fine, deportation 
if not reverse effects of underground exploitation. 
Since the coup d’état in May 2014, the Thai geo-body sanitizing has clearly become a cyclical 
pattern. The government claimed national security interest and implemented a rigid policy on illegal 
migrant workers in the country. People got panic. Then business is effected and the government 
need to loosen up its policy again. As of January 2018, the new rigid Decree implementation has 
been put off twice since its first enforcement in June 2017.  Although the history seems to repeat 
itself, this time, one thing that looms large in the process, is the leverage of voluntary deportation 
as part of the public discourses on legalization. Deportation, voluntary or not, becomes more 
pervasive in the Thai public media as the government tries to forge return of illegal migrants to their 
countries of origin and reenter Thailand through the government-to-government MOU channel if 
not going through the national verification process. Like other times since the beginning of 
registration in 1992, the Thai government reiterated that there will no longer be the next round of 
registration for illegal migrants inside the country: migrant workers need to go through either the 
national verification process or the MOU channel. Those who fail to be legalized through these 
processes will be subject to legal punishment and deportation. Although the deportation is not a 
new practice for the Thai state (cf. Human Right Watch, 2012) this time, it has become more 
worrying due to the political and economic contexts in which the deportation signifies the resource 
enclosure (Jones, 2016; 2012). The Thai border regime was systematically designed to keep low-
skilled migrant workers out of the heartland of knowledge-based economic prosperity, thereby 
costing the migrants more expensive and dangerous voyage to a better economic opportunity.  
During the past four years from 2014-2017, I have conducted multiple interviews with two 
representatives from the Yaung Chi Oo, a Community-Based Organization (CBO), who has been the 
front line of migrant worker rights in Mae Sot. As far as the staff’s first-hand experiences along the 
Thai-Burmese borders are concerned, their opinion regarding the situations of labor migration form 
Myanmar to Thailand and migrant worker rights protection mechanism, remain the same despite 
the drastic political and economic changes at the centers of both Myanmar and Thailand. Migrants 
will continue crossing the border to Thailand mainly because of the better economic opportunity in 
Thailand. The Yaung Chi Oo’s borderland perspective corresponds to the situations of Hlaing Tharyar 
SEZ workers in Yangon covered by the Myanmar Times (2017), which shows that workers in the 
industrial zones still earned significantly less than their counterparts on the Thai side of the border. 
On the other hand, my ethnographic data shows that local business in the border areas have 
suffered labor shortage since the dawn of democratization of Myanmar in 2011. The border 
economic regime that builds on the suppress of migrant labor wage is therefore self-destructive as 
the workers tried to seek opportunity to flee the extremely low wage to a more sustainable payment 
in the inner part of Thailand. In an interview, a business person even likened Mae Sot to an 
apprentice town where migrant workers crossed the border to attain some occupational and 
language skills and move away to the Thai inner cities for better-paid job, with their better skills. 
The SEZ and AEC hype, that tried to promote cross border economic activities, have engendered 
a significant transformation of the Thai-Burmese borderlands. Land price speculation was so 
inflating. Advertisements for land sale, property renting, or even temporary housing catering for 
business persons and middle-class tourists were not uncommon along the main roads in town More 
new infrastructures. The borderland has changed and become more urbanized with the labor of 
migrant workers. There are more condominiums, life-style shopping malls, and neighborhood 
gentrification, all of which were materialized with migrant labor power. But once, the space was 
transformed, the presence of migrant became absent from the border landscape. They were desired 
to be part of this border prosperity narrative again as consumers crossing the border to consume 
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modernity and development, which has not yet existed on the Myanmar, but Thai sides. The Ads in 
Burmese scripts tell it all.   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: After the announcement border SEZ, various forms of property development sprung up in 
Mae Sot and its vicinity. In this photo, an affordable hotel targeting short-term visitors and 
fews commercial buildings were newly built along the Asian Highway Road toward the 
permanent border pass at the Thai-Myanmar Friendship Bridge. Photo by the author. 
9. Conclusion  
 This paper uses the Thai state’s spatial practice envisioned through its economic development 
plan to explore the political imagination about the Thai geo-body. The analysis is delivered through 
the lens of the central-peripheral spatial relationship. It shows how the Thai state responded to the 
structural change in the global economic restructuring that resulted in transnational flows of things 
and people, which in turn pose a challenge to the conventional ideas of state sovereignty over its 
territory. The Thai state reterritorialized its borderlands by endorsing the implementation of Article 
14 of the Alien Employment Act (2008), a more relaxed immigration law to maintain supply of cheap 
labor from its neighboring countries to feed its export-led industrial sector. In another layer, the 
reorganized social relationships between the sovereign and its non-subjects does not mean a lesser 
degree of bordering by othering (Joseph and Rothfuss, 2014) as the government hardened its policy 
on undocumented migrant worker legalization and encouraged the government-to-government 
labor import scheme which is cost-prohibitive to many migrants. These moves, at the end, portray 
the vision of exclusive prosperity within a national boundary. While the Thai state proceeds to 
position its national geo-body as an accommodating space for the appealing transnational flows of 
capital and high-valued technology, an important question underlining this move also looms large: 
how the rhetoric of sustainable development and economic prosperity could be materialized with a 
discriminating policy that is based on the simplified and fragile dichotomy between the inside and 
outside of the border?  
Appendix A: List of Acronyms 
ASEAN  Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
AEC         ASEAN Economic Community  
ADB         Asian Development Bank  
Article 14     Article 14 in the Alien Employment Act B.E.2551 (2008) 
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BOI          Board of Investment (of Thailand) 
CBO         Community-Based Organization 
EEC          Eastern Economic Corridor 
GMS         Greater Mekong Subregion 
GMS-ECP   Greater Mekong Subregion Economic Cooperation Program  
MNCs        Multinational Companies 
MOU         Memorandum of Understanding 
MRPWG      Migrant Rights Promotion Working Group 
NCPO         National Council for Peace and Order  
NC-SEZ      National Committee on Special Economic Zone Development  
SEZ          Special Economic Zone   
TNCs         Transnational Companies 
UN           United Nations 
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